Is it possible to think what Martin Heidegger addressed in his philosophy of ‘being’ we can zoom ‘it’ on Hilary Putnam‘s theory of meaning? Be it possible to read Heidegger through zoomed him on Putnam’s Twin Earth Thought Experiment? He welcomed his readers treated this earth a duplicate of ‘Typical Earth’ where we are living now. Both planets are identical to each other in all extents. Not only that, citizens of both typical and twin have used on dwelt the same reality; and in this case, both of them speak English with bit different meaning.
Putnam picked ‘water’ as an example for his thought experiment. Twin Earth citizens are well concerned with ‘water’ as like their Doppelganger (mean double of living person) Typical Earthians; they just use a different word to mean it. Twin Earthians called it ‘XYZ’ instead of ‘water’. However, the science community of Typical Earth has intended to know the substance that makes ‘water’ or its appearance on the planet. They added new meaning to it and said, —hydrogen and oxygen molecules are the main cause for ‘water’ and we can call it H2O. That mean ‘water’ is not like what we have usually meant it. We should accept the new information that a compound assembles of two molecules have made it; thus, if anybody calls it H2O calling the name of ‘water’, we cannot say him wrong for this. The picture is same for Twin Earthians. The science community has intended to mean ‘XYZ’ (that is ‘water’ for Typical Earthians) a complicated compound of molecules. When they are talking about ‘XYZ’ it as well as mean the atomic and chemical complexity behind it.
Here we can consider the previous name and meaning (that is ‘water’) is primary and common for both Earthians. Both of them use this word without imposed an intended possession to it. However, we cannot let go the second (that is a new name and meaning of ‘water’) in this way. New meaning addressed ‘water or XYZ’ a fact for typical and twin Earthians. It said, ‘water’ has a birth; it has substance and that is the reason for its birth. True, this scientific interpretation of ‘water or XYZ’ doesn’t replace the traditional meaning as a whole, but it added a different value to the previous meaning. The impact of this late addition has appeared with a new reality for both of the typical and twin Earthians. They have now compelled to memorize the new name and meaning of ‘water or XYZ’ through cognizance.
… Thus we can say, the ontology of an object (in this case the ontology of the ‘water or XYZ’ and its preliminary name and meaning) is lame to debunk its ‘ontological’ beingness (including its name and meaning) in the world. This problem led Putnam to consider the beingness of ‘water or XYZ’ in both Typical and Twin Earth as unintended extensions; and equally, he treated the original name and meaning an ostensive experience for the Earthians.
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This cognitive burden of remembering new name and meaning of the old object bring up some changes in both Earthians mind. It forced them to consider the difference between ‘primary and later’ meaning of ‘water or XYZ’. Besides, it clears their connectivity with ‘water’-like ostensive object, that how they relate them to it and mean it by name. Any primary name and meaning of object mean something that is common for all citizens. Maybe they mean it by different words but the sense of the object must contain its semblance in any extent. Suppose to say Hilary Putnam treated the ostensive sense of ‘water’ as common for all Typical and Twin Earthians. This common knowing about ‘water’ is unintentional in nature. All Earthians attuned by this knowing that ‘water or XYZ’ is the life-giving elements for living organisms.
This ostensive quality of object has no relation with what name and meaning we’ve given to address it. An ostensive object contained its own ‘meaning’ inside which helped it exists in the apparent world. Putnam bit mystified it to say, the ostensive ‘water’ cannot be subjected to the name and meaning which we might apply to mean it. It has its own subjectivity with meaning and as well as name. The problem is we cannot know this because ‘water’ or such like object do not talk with us about its own subjectivity. It’s not necessary for ‘water or XYZ’ like object to communicate with us; rather we are obliged to make a connection with it. That is Putnam mean ‘pointing’; it as if like a finger of that object pointed us to make a connection with it, and as well as mean it by the name and meaning suppose ‘water or XYZ’. Means an inevitable necessity compelled us to connect with ‘water or XYZ’ types object.
… The ‘originary’ is such remoteness where the mind cannot get its access; where ‘being’ always ‘throws’ itself by its ‘beingness’; and where our query-minded mental condition cannot reach to observe it. We can consider Putnam’s ‘water or XYZ’ in that contextual. The original name and meaning of ‘water or XYZ’ contained ‘remoteness’. Its ontology is unknown and as well as the ontological beingness happened in the unknown state.
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It not the typical or twin Earthians who give a name and meaning of ‘water or XYZ’; it ‘water’ itself which pointed the Earthians to make a connection with it; since except for this both Earthians cannot survive. The meaning is clear here, ‘water’ itself contained such quality which compelled the Earthians signified it through a common name and meaning; in Putnam’s case that is ‘water or XYZ’. Who named it ‘water or XYZ’? Such kind of question is useless in that context. No individual is responsible to mean it this way. The societal approach might be the reason; it insisted the society-members naming it by ‘water or XYZ’, and they named it without having any ‘intension’ in their mind to name it. If we consider Putnam’s approach then we can say:
Naming and meaning typology when discussed primary name and meaning of objects (suppose ‘water or XYZ’) it might reflect the ‘natural revealness’ of naming an object through commune-approach. Primary naming typology doesn’t contain the cognitive value, what we’ve seen in the case of naming ‘water’ as H2O or mean it by this way. A primary name and meaning of ‘water-like’ typology first fulfill the ‘natural process’ of naming; besides, this name appeared common for all so that people can understand their natural relationship with the named object.
On the opposite, late addition of ‘water or XYZ’ varied in a context. The scientific community of both typical and twin earth interprets it in a different manner. The Typical Earth scientists appoint their attention to know the inner ‘intension’ that might be combined hydrogen and oxygen to make ‘water’. As well as, Twin Earth scientists explained it in a different way. They found more than two molecules and a very complex compound in its structure of which they commonly mean ‘XYZ’. This difference indicates cognitive meaning and definition is incapable to hold the ‘original meaning’ that might be the reason for all primary and later name and meaning of objects.
Cognitive naming depends on the person who intended to name an object with clarifications. For instance, John Archibald Wheeler‘s Delayed Choice Experiment explained it with plausible references. His thought experiment exhibits how the observer can influence the reality of object that he selects to observe. In the Delayed Choice experiment, an observer can take a decision what he wants to see through the photon-detector when the photon has passed through the screen. It shows he can easily influence photon’s traveling path by closing or opening the light-trajectory slits according to his decision.
… This division confined the language-product like a commercial-chain and indebted the Earthians to follow it. The prolongation moved the whole ‘commercial society’ whirling around the fence, in where they treated their self-made name and meaning as the only weapon to understand the ‘original beingness’ of objects in the world. It might be erroneous, because, an object has its own origin and subjective meaning which helped it to exits in the reality.
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John Wheeler’s narration about his Delayed Choice Experiment:
“The double-slit experiment both in the familiar version and in the “delayed-choice” version. The familiar layout includes the source of photons at the top, the entering slit, the first lens, the double slit metal screen that covers it, and the photographic plate that registers interference fringes. We secure delayed choice by supplements to this classic arrangement. We replace the continuous source of illumination at the top by a source that gives off one photon per timed flash. We slice the photographic plate to make it into a Venetian blind. We make a last-minute choice, after the photon has already traversed the double slit screen, whether to open this blind or close it. Closed, as shown, it registers on a blackened grain of silver halide emulsion the arrival of that photon “through both slits.” Opened, it allows the light to be focused by the second, or L. F. Bartell, lens on the two-photon counters. There being only one photon, only one counter goes off. It tells “through which slit” the photon came. In this sense we decide, after the photon has passed through the screen, whether it shall have passed through only one slit or both.” [See: Beyond the Black Hole: John Archibald Wheeler; Page: 356-358]
Everything depends on the observer that how he interprets to mean the trajectory of light-source and our relation with it. The observed photon particles can take ‘wave-like trajectory’ in the quantum level experiment if we permit them going through both slits of the screen at the same time. To the contrary, if we compelled the photon particles traveled along one slit they can take ‘particle-like route’. For argument’s sake if we consider the first choice of the observer as plausible for us then we can say, —typical and twin both earth are a singular event and everything is created there in this singular way; thus, no other reality is possible except this. If we choose second, then we cannot consider the reality of both earth a singular event; ‘wave-like’ trajectory of particles have contained all possible state, from where a ‘multiple reality’ might originate at the same time.
Therefore, the name and meaning of objects in the reality are very critical to define. Our cognitive knowledge and ontology and as well as the semantics look void when we think about the origin, from where all this every-thing has come and passed out. We are not sure in which trajectory the ‘being process’ has taken to create everything where we are revolving now. We know the structure of reality and that is our limit for naming the objects with meaning; but the fundamental is yet unknown to us, as much as the name and meaning of it.
In that sense, the naming and meaning process is always a late addition for us. Whatever it is ‘water, XYZ or H2O’… all are coming when we connected all this stuff by using our ostensive sensitivity and cognition. The ostensive objects obliged our ostensive sensory to make a connection with them. Consequently, all types of name and meaning are a late addition to the ‘being’, which we are make-bound to think the ‘fundamental originary and common’ reason for any beingness.
What Putnam discussed in his interesting thought experiment, tried to differentiate the beingness of objects according to the ‘intension and extension of reality’ with relevant example, what he exemplified by semantics… all are abortive to mean the ‘fundamental intension’ (that could be the origin of all created objects) with realistic naming and abreast meaning. ‘Fundamental intension’ of objects is such kind of thinking which we cannot escape by considering it meaningless for us. Creation might be the phenomenon that cannot exist without its ‘fundamental intension’. However, what be the property which we can consider as ‘fundamental’ for all kind of beingness? What is that ‘fundamental intension’, for due to this every-thing exist and played their role like the automated machine? If we think Putnam’s typical and twin earth a machine then the question is indisputable: what ‘fundamental intension’ played as a reason for this identical reality?
This is a big deal for human knowledge discipline. Putnam as well disturbed by this. His thought experiment has also driven him to face the problem of detecting ‘fundamental intension of objects’ with care. It shows Human-given name and meaning of objects can change by sudden moment because to the appearance of new name and meaning. Because of that, anew representation of name and meaning has always contained the possibility where ‘intension’ appears as an extension of reality; and to the contrary, an extension of name and meaning extended our ‘intension’ to extend it more. However, this type extension cannot change the ‘fundamental intension’ of the object; it played its role to generate it in the reality. The later addition of name and meaning suppose H2O or whatever, it cannot change the paradigm what both Earthians have used to mean ‘water’. If a typical Earthian filled a glass with ‘water’ and called it H2O, or else a Twin Earthian filled it with the chemical bonding of molecules ‘X, Y, Z’ and claimed it ‘XYZ’, in each context the liquidity of ‘water’ will remain the same.
… No need to mention it ‘external’ as Putnam tried. It is just a beingness of objects in always one tense state and that is ‘present tense’. There is no ‘past tense’ in actual Heideggerian context. Past tense is actually a series of ‘present tense’, seeming ‘past’ due to its remoteness. What we can do to mean the ‘always happening’ state of ‘being’? Heidegger answered it with his poetical rhetorics.
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It means primary or later name and meaning cannot change the ‘fundamental intension’ of the object. We can say if ‘liquidity’ (in any form or combination) exists, whatever it means, this meaning cannot replace the marked identity of it. “The glass is full of ‘liquid’ and it is ‘water”, —the sense will always remain to all extents. Meaning can change at times but what ‘water’ contained inside, that is sensing it as ‘water’ to us, this paradigm is unalterable in any extents. If our ostensive sensory-paradigm unable to recognize the ‘water’ for its specific change or scientific alteration, in that case, it might be not ‘water’; it may be the anew-made object, needed a new paradigm to mean it.
Putnam’s thought experiment showed how the paradigm (sensing ‘water as water’) remains intact where a group of speakers is unaware of the newly invented naming or meaning. This group was the resident of typical earth a near 50 year ago and no nothing about the scientific name and meaning of ‘water’. If any case they could travel today’s earth where people called ‘water’ H2O, despite the name-confusion they are able to identify ‘water as water’. The fundamental paradigm of water (suppose its liquidity) helped them in this particular case to say, —it is the same ‘thing’ which once existed in the river and they treated it the life-source for all living beings.
This unison recognition of ‘water’ provoked Putnam to think the reverse. His moral might be like this: we are not able to name objects or give a meaning to it; instead of, objects compelled us to mean it by this way. Name and meaning are topical for an object (suppose ‘water’ in that case); it could be changed by sudden moment but what made ‘water’ that ‘fundamental property and intension’ is external. This property always existed as unique and fundamental for it so that it can flow down the rivers, and alongside connected Earthians to call it by a name and meaning. Means, what made ‘water’ ‘original’ it is nonnegotiable for cognizance and ontology of human semantics.
Here Putnam considers the existence of ‘water’ in light of ‘externalism‘. The moral of this is simple: self-contained meaning of objects has stayed out of cognizance to the mind. Psychological and semantics recognition cannot deal the external meaning of an object. This differentiation of ‘meaning’ indicates reality can diverge itself through new disclosure of meaning, and alongside it diverged our mind to accept the new reality with different name and meaning. Putnam called it “meaning of ‘meaning“, in where the ‘truth’ is relative because of the following reasons:
I. The primary and common meaning of ‘water or XYZ’ is ubiquitous in both earth until a new cognitive-base meaning has appeared there to extend the sense of reality with new meaning and symbols.
II. Meaning of object differs when the question of its ‘substance’ has appeared in our mind. It insisted us relates to the object as the members of Adam Smith’s ‘commercial society‘ relate them. A particular product has made-in there through specific labor division. Each individual or group makes a specific part of the product, and another group assembles all parts in finishing-level. Putnam sees the labor-division in semantics. He thinks semantically we follow the same division of name and meaning in the society.
First of all human given name and meaning of any objects is not an individual contribution. The most ‘near natural’ name and meaning of objects has come from the commune, as suppose we can hold ‘water or XYZ’ type common naming in this category. Same as H2O types name and meaning is coming from the scientific commune. ‘Water means H2O’ or ‘H2O means water’, —this representation might come from the ‘interpreters commune‘.
This division confined the language-product like a commercial-chain and indebted the Earthians to follow it. The prolongation moved the whole ‘commercial society’ whirling around the fence, in where they treated their self-made name and meaning as the only weapon to understand the ‘original beingness’ of objects in the world. It might be erroneous, because, an object has its own origin and subjective meaning which helped it to exits in the reality.
III. The ‘fundamental intension’ of ‘water’ like object and its natural beingness in our mind indicates, it somehow an ‘originary’ which could exist before we named it by meaning. Putnam named it ‘externality’. Means water has ‘external quality out of its meaning as ‘water, H2O or whatever it is‘, which we’ve imposed to make our relation clear with it.
In that sense, whatever the meaning of ‘water’ is, all are ‘external’ to it. To the contrary, the ‘water’ itself contained its own ‘internal meaning’ that helps it to exist through the compoundness of its substances. When we mean hydrogen and oxygen as ‘substance’ of water, it replaced our previous (or conventional) perception to it. This perplexity led us to the following realization:
When we define ‘water’ as H2O or XYZ for searching from what elements it has made -in, this searching leads our mind to extend the name and meaning of ‘water’ through our self-intensive question about its origin. First ‘meaning of water’ constructed based on the ostensible presence of ‘water’ and its pragmatic impact in our life. The second represents the non-ostensible reality of ‘water’ as H2O or XYZ; we can theorize it by the cognitive process but it cannot represents its own ostensibility in front us. As quantum-particles cannot represent their ostensive presence, and we theorized them to say they are the essence of all ostensive objects. This claimant represents a separate reality in front us, to think about the object’s origin with precise assumptions. However, assumptions are not a guaranty of the truthful existence of quantum-like beingness.
… Allegorically we can say, the going stream let them go to the ‘nothingness’ and new stream appeared again to the river from it. The process of ‘going and coming’ in such way is technological. This consideration led Heidegger set his ‘nothingness’ as reverse to the indisputable ‘thereness of being’ where river-streams let them go but not permit them to go in a ‘nothing’ state; instead of, they faded them in the ‘thereness’ state; means they always belong in the ‘standing reserve’ state for ‘contrivance’, obviously by humans.
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This is the entry-point of Heidegger’s metaphysical ‘being’ in Putnam case. What he meant by ‘external’, Heidegger has already mentioned (obviously in a different way) this by naming it ‘essence of being and the beingness’ of objects in the world. Not literally and just for the argument sake, if we hold on hydrogen and oxygen as ‘essence’ of ‘water’, Heidegger then clearly admits them in such state where our mind cannot access to naming it. This state is Dasein to him. An always-happening state where ‘essence of being’ assembling them to make something from the void looking nothing. Rhetorically every ‘essence’ contained its own ‘being and beingness’ by self, and when they conferencing each other the ostensive ‘beingness’ of the world happened.
Heidegger’s mind imagined this ‘meta’ position of ‘essence’ as reverse to say it ‘thereness’. Dasein is such state that cannot be emptied by nothingness. The reason, when ‘essence’ takes a place (mean its own space) we cannot say it ‘nothing’; it is ‘there’ with its ‘thereness’. That is why ‘nothing’ doesn’t exist in his paradigm. Which exists there that is the metaphysical fundamentality of ‘essence’. Heidegger did not mention it by this way, but today we can consider his ‘essence’ in a scientific context. It reflexes the endless rebeginning of ‘energy flow’. ‘Energy’ has no beginning but always moving toward destruction, transformation, and reconstruction. Same as ‘being’ is the combination of such ‘essence’ that has no beginning except for rebeginning. The process of rebeginning is a self-automated movingness of ‘essence’. It stayed far beyond from our cognitive limit.
We are not able to observe it so that a meaning of ‘essence’ could possible. The presence of ‘essence’ in Dasein is not a rigid domain. It is an always-happening state for ‘being, beings, and beingness’. Every ‘being’ has its own ‘essence’ and when they dance with each other, it combines them in a unison singular form. Putnam’s identical earth, they might be created in this way where ‘being’ relentlessly ‘throw’ itself to make the ostensive reality over again. The game of beingness is endless in that sense; and as well as, the ‘throwness’ of ‘being’ is a never-ending process. ‘Essence’ might not exist except for this. To the same, if ‘energy’ in some way coming to the end then the law of thermodynamics will collapse. It might not possible. The meaning which ‘energy’ contained within, it protests it lost in ending.
Our ontology-based mind can think about the whole process by using its cognizance, it can philosophize it, but the original nature of ‘being’ always remains a rhetoric for us. We can retrograde remote and remote to find it source and place, but which is ‘thereness’ it cannot be echoed ‘ideal world’ or seeming like ‘heaven or hell’; its transcendental location could only mention by the phrase, —it always there and will always be there. ‘Thereness’ might be the actual repetition of ‘present’ presence in the present. Beingness happened there through the assembling of ‘essence’. No need to mention it ‘external’ as Putnam tried. It is just a beingness of objects in always one tense state and that is ‘present tense’. There is no ‘past tense’ in actual Heideggerian context. Past tense is actually a series of ‘present tense’, seeming ‘past’ due to its remoteness. What we can do to mean the ‘always happening’ state of ‘being’? Heidegger answered it with his poetical rhetoric:
“Being, once the lightning that suddenly bursts and draws all things into its light according to their measure and law and import—now a weary semblance allowing all import and measure to steal away.
Being—a gift, a jubilation and a shudder, a question—the beginning. Being—an exhausted possession, an object of prattle, a bore, a name—the end.
Being as the lightning flash of the essence and afterwards the abiding semblance of the essence.
The beginning and the history of the disempowerment of the essence in being. “Ontology” as the entrenchment and sanctification of the disempowered essence.” [See: Black Notebooks: Martin Heidegger]
Objects extend reality and to the reverse extension makes ‘intension’ to extend the reality in Hilary Putnam’s semantics. In that sense, we are living in a virtual reality because object obliged us to think its extension as ‘virtual reality’ for us. Heidegger’s approach is different here. To him, naming might be ‘risky’ for which we think has contained something ‘originary’ before its appearance. He said in the context of his ‘Being and time‘, “It is always risky to give names to the basic positions of philosophical thinking.” [See: Black Notebooks, Martin Heidegger] Who named ‘water’ (?) —solve this question is like retrograde to the remote past to assume how ‘being’ was happened.
We still encircled around the fence and questioned us, —which version we can hold to understand the world with plausible approval? In Putnam’s case, we can define ‘water’ mean original; thus, so far the ‘water’ flows as far reality extends. The person who knows ‘water’ and unaware about H2O his reality-sense has to be driven by the conventional name and meaning of ‘water’, but the same person if he cognizant about both ‘water and H2O’ then his reality-sense can go beyond over the ‘water’. That means he is make-bound adjusted him with the extended name and meaning, and this way he adjusted with reality. In this point, Martin Heidegger helped us to understand this that, which name and meaning we can hold on to reach the original beingness of objects is critical to decide.
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… Heidegger did not mention it by this way, but today we can consider his ‘essence’ in a scientific context. It reflexes the endless rebeginning of ‘energy flow’. ‘Energy’ has no beginning but always moving toward destruction, transformation, and reconstruction. Same as ‘being’ is the combination of such ‘essence’ that has no beginning except for rebeginning. The process of rebeginning is a self-automated movingness of ‘essence’. It stayed far beyond from our cognitive limit.
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The appearance of new meaning is sort like ‘contrivance’, a neo-impose to the old meaning that is, ‘water or XYZ’ is not just ‘water’, it has some inner elements which makes it ‘water or XYZ’. By hired Heidegger’s insight about ‘being and beings of the being’ as an allegory, we can say the name ‘water or XYZ’ is nothing but a reflection of ‘originary’. ‘Water’ has its ‘originary beingness’ and the compoundness (mean hydrogen and oxygen) is the individual ‘essence’ of that beingness. It compelled ‘water-like’ object ‘throws’ itself in Putnam’s earth over again.
The ‘original’ meaning (that is ‘water or XYZ’) was suddenity for Putnam’s world. Earthians have uttered this as praxis to express the common symptoms of it. Means their connection with the name and meaning of ‘water or XYZ’ doesn’t contain such value that could be treated ‘ontological’ for them. ‘Water or XYZ’ is an essential element for both worlds from the beginning of it. However, the citizens do not bother them by questioning its origin. It could have some ontological value, this thinking is a later approach to mind and majority people yet utilize it (mean ‘water or XYZ’) by staying far beyond this. They get it (mean the name and meaning of ‘water or XYZ’) by praxis and now easygoing to mean it as a life-giver for all living organisms.
It indicates people’s connectivity with ‘water or XYZ’ is a remote and primordial event for them; alongside, their relations with it is a ‘somehow resonance‘ of Heidegger’s ‘originary’. The ‘originary’ is such remoteness where the mind cannot get its access; where ‘being’ always ‘throws’ itself by its ‘beingness‘; and where our query-minded mental condition cannot reach to observe it. We can consider Putnam’s ‘water or XYZ’ in that contextual. The original name and meaning of ‘water or XYZ’ contained ‘remoteness’. Its ontology is unknown and as well as the ontological beingness happened in the unknown state.
A person who believed in ‘theology’ he could answer it by saying this: the original name and meaning of ‘water or XYZ’ has come directly to the God; he created human beings with the capacity of identifying objects and named it by using his sensory intellect. The person who believed in science he can answering this to say, name and meaning happened at the development stage of human language; our sensory organs and brain-neurology helped us for doing this job at the stage of evolution. Same, a person who thought himself a metaphysical philosopher or poet might answer this question bit different manner; he can say name and meaning are transcendental suddenity; it depends on the relation where a person or group of persons named an object by sudden and later invented a meaning for it.
All this answer have a limitation that is any presumable answer about the ‘original object’ is inept to justify the ‘originary beingness’ of that object; and to the parallel, the name and meaning of it. Means, the ‘originary’ of any-thing could be questioned but it always remains unanswerable, because, the mind cannot go such remoteness with dare proof where the event (beingness and the naming of it) has happened at once. Thus we can say, the ontology of an object (in this case the ontology of the ‘water or XYZ’ and its preliminary name and meaning) is lame to debunk its ‘ontological’ beingness (including its name and meaning) in the world. This problem led Putnam to consider the beingness of ‘water or XYZ’ in both Typical and Twin Earth as unintended extensions; and equally, he treated the original name and meaning an ostensive experience for the Earthians.
… the name and meaning of objects in the reality are very critical to define. Our cognitive knowledge and ontology and as well as the semantics look void when we think about the origin, from where all this every-thing has come and passed out. We are not sure in which trajectory the ‘being process’ has taken to create everything where we are revolving now. We know the structure of reality and that is our limit for naming the objects with meaning; but the fundamental is yet unknown to us, as much as the name and meaning of it.
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On the other hand, the philosophical problem of unintended extension of ‘originary’ led Heidegger to think about such state where ‘origin’ contained its own ‘ontology’ and ‘throw’ itself over again. Anyway, it unable to answer any question about its ontological beingness. As we can say (not literally, just for argument’s sake) God (if we imagine God as ‘prime mover’ in Aristotle’s context) himself is unable to answer the question: —why He is God or how He exists as a variable to generate his beingness which moves everything for the creation. Because which is uncreated it cannot answer any question through ‘itself’. As Heidegger’s Dasein cannot answer why it Dasein. Like this manner, Putnam faces the basic analytical problem of the meaning in semantics when it means ‘something’ original and origin.
For this reason, we can say, the original name and meaning of ‘water or XYZ’ is mind neutral, a repercussion of praxis, where some commune once named it as ‘water’ and rests are let them going on this phrase without ‘intension’. There is ‘bit’ semblance between Heidegger and Putnam. Heidegger let the original ‘being’ (in this case if we hold ‘water or XYZ’ as ‘being’) going to its own order and discipline. This uninterrupted goingness of ‘water’ or whatever it is, it can solve the mystery that why things let them goes without consciousness. Goingness is such phenomena which tried to mean like this: ‘water or XYZ-like’ objects can go them autonomous; we can experience the extension of it but cannot create it; at best named it and its name is its meaning. In Heidegger’s phrasing which is technology, that is not a ‘being’. The beingness is such-like Heraclitus’ river where a stream of water has let them go and new streams fill the river over again.
Allegorically we can say, the going stream let them go to the ‘nothingness’ and new stream appeared again to the river from it. The process of ‘going and coming’ in such way is technological. This consideration led Heidegger set his ‘nothingness’ as reverse to the indisputable ‘thereness of being‘ where river-streams let them go but not permit them to go in a ‘nothing’ state; instead of, they faded them in the ‘thereness’ state; means they always belong in the ‘standing reserve’ state for ‘contrivance’, obviously by humans.
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