Slavoj Žižek’s critics heard plausible to the readers who think Heidegger was whimsical to understand the real nature of “being” in a truthful ground. His critical approach on dwells with language (what we’ve discussed in previous two segments of the article; See Segment-1 & Segment-2) become convincing for such readers who think Heidegger grounded his “being” in the wrong way; they may think so, his representation of “beings” as an intimation of timeless “being” leads him nowhere. Žižek tried to give such an idea to his readers: —Heidegger’s critical thinking indicates the absence of realistic approach when he disclaimed Descartes “cogito” as a ground for “being”. Slavoj Žižek swayed his readers to believe this that Lacan’s assertion of “cogito” is more realistic than Heidegger’s refutation; he (Lacan) explained why cogitation of “being” is necessary to figure out the real reason of our existence in the reality.
… This partitioning indicates the anxiety of being. According to Heidegger, the genesis of “being” not means production (Entstehung); rather it means position; “as to emerge and to rise up [Aufstehen]”. This positioning could happen from the myriad events of the time; that’s why if anybody wants to search the originary of “being” he cannot connect him with it through the apparent reality; he must make a journey to the remote and lone antiquity when it happened beyond over his familiarity with the language.
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How “being” can know itself without asking about its being when it commences out in this referential time-space or whatever it is! —this approach leads Žižek to take a reverse course against Heidegger. Besides, it drives him to draw the canvas where Heidegger appeared an unrealistic and whimsical thinker when he put forward his arguments on the philosophy of “being”. Thus, it easy for Žižek’s readers treat Heidegger’s texts a whimsical word game; yeah, not so bad for playing a while but very impractical to deal the realistic problem of suchlike “beings” (suppose human beings), who might be the real progeny of that metaphysical amorphous “being”.
When Žižek stands critical on Heidegger’s approach to the Cartesian “cogito” he might forget, Heidegger very clearly make a division between the cogitation and non-cogitation process to get the real answer about “being”. For instance, we human beings can think about the “being” by using our cogitation, and yes we can explain it in myriad ways, but all are referential determinate about the process where “being” forced upon itself to appear as “beings”. Why and how “being” happened over again or why “I exist”, —an answer to this question is nonnegotiable for the language we’ve used on. We can try to go beyond the language for searching the space-time referential (in that case Heidegger’s Da-sein) where “being” appears as “beings” through the unknowable assimilation and segregation; —this entire process of beingness might comprehensible through meditative thinking but it maintained its remoteness to the Cartesian meaning of “being”.
Descartes statement is convenient to understand the apparent nature of “beings” in the reality where they exist; contrary, his “cogito” is detrimental to realize such state what Heidegger means the pure beingness of “non-cogitational being”. This “being” is the fundamental essence of all cogitational “beings” e.g. we humans are the cogitational “beings” of the non-cogitational “being”. The meaning is, human “cogito” can actually think “beings” but cannot think about the fundamental “being”. Which is fundamental that is played its rule likewise the self-governed naturalist. Yes, we humans can feel the naturalist through meditative thinking, but it (meditative thinking) must be non-cogitational in nature.
Cartesian “cogito” enframed our thinking to take the decision that if we think we exist; Heidegger’s meditation persuade our mind to go beyond the language so that we “beings” can realize the openness of such self-governed naturalist; who might be the original reason of all this creation and destruction. Descartes “cogito” is immobile where language promoted fixity. Heidegger’s meditation promoted openness; the language of that openness conditioned by to raise anew-questions. Openness means question; and, questions are reluctant to get any decisive answers about the beingness and so on.
The logic is simple here; if we want to discuss the original or fundamental, we should remember: —original cannot talk by itself; fundamental cannot answer by itself; so all searching about original or fundamental must be done by following the non-determinate meditation process of language. Cartesian “cogito” has suffered by the absence which Heidegger treats an essential for dealing the original history of “being” in the Da-sein (pure state) and Dasein (where we lived as historical elements of the “being”, means this apparent world). Cartesian “cogito” sacrificed “being” to the scientific rationale, where human beings are unable to think the essence of creation by overcoming the eroded physical agents. That’s the real point where Heidegger differs with Descartes and many other cogitational thinkers.
… The question is inevitable there, —why Hegel avoid this? Heidegger explained the reason in his book “Being and Time” with careful humbleness. Hegel forgets to mention the “phenomenal negative experience” because such phenomena (Hegel mentioned it “self-relating negativity of being”) was difficult to explain. When “being” stayed in the “nothingness” state and interacts itself by staying there, —this transcendental position happened in that state beyond over the cognitive science of humans. Hegel was make-bound to mystify this state in his “Science of logic”.
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No doubt, Heidegger negates Cartesian “cogito” to think it a misleading interpretation of “being”. Why he did this? Žižek tried to deal this question in his article. He enframed Hegel and Lacan’s perception about “being” and “nothingness” so that he can mark Heidegger’s apprehension erroneous for the thinking of “being”. He thinks Heidegger rejects “cogito” because it represents a mathematical universe for the “being”; this “cogito” subjected the “being” only for scientific rationale by forgetting the original subjectivity of it (mean “being”); whereas original subjectivity indicates the autonomous presence of “being” in the unknowable state. The entire meaning of it means when “being” happened it happened in the unknowable state without any cogitation of “being”. Žižek thinks yonder consideration led Heidegger to classify the “being” from the “beings”; he then classified the reality of “being” to the reality of “beings”, while he tried to mean over again in his texts and lectures that is, —“being and beings” happening in the same state; and, when they appear in existence they take the same course to appear.
Because of that consideration, Žižek tried to sway his readers: Heidegger forgets his own basic point when he reproaches Descartes; he forgets: a “being” cannot ask about its own “being” until it appears as “beings”. Only “beings”, the plural existence of “being”, only it can ask, —why “being” happened and what could be the reason for it? This painful question drives “beings” to think about the reality where they exist. Žižek hired Lacan for saying it “jouissance” or the anxious ecstasy of life. Any argument of “why being happened”, it cannot be negotiable if “beings” failed to realize the delightful ecstasy in spite of anxiety that “I think therefore I am.” Žižek thinks Heidegger’s inability of considers “cogito” a necessary element for grounding the real “being”…, it makes his arguments unrealistic and whimsical for any further philosophical investigation of “being”.
The pain a “beings” feel after its appearance in the world, it should be treated as a real course if we want to know how “being” approach itself when it came out to the ultimate mysterious nothingness. Not only this, language appeared a crucial factor there; it forced a “being” to stands “for cogito” instead of stands “against cogito”; e.g., Lacan stands for it and Žižek hired him to refute Heidegger:
“Lacan first accepts Heidegger’s point that the Cartesian cogito, which grounds modern science and its mathematicized universe, announces the highest forgetting of Being; but for Lacan, the Real of jouissance is precisely external to Being, so that what is for Heidegger the argument AGAINST cogito is for Lacan the argument FOR cogito–the real of jouissance can only be approached when we exit the domain of being.” [See: Hegel versus Heidegger by Slavoj Žižek]
Žižek’s readers can treat the above-mentioned paragraph a serious mistake of Heidegger, from where they can charge him to mislead “cogito” in such way. Readers can surmise Heidegger in the pretext that his “Being and time” failed to ground the real anxiety of “being”. We infer Žižek’s followers can reproach Heidegger in excuse of it: —his “Being” doesn’t feel the necessity to think about the reason for its own “being”; instead, it always escapes from the language that tried to make it argumentum. They can cannonade Heidegger through this allegation: —his “being” takes them in such antique remoteness where language lost its ability to feel Hegel-mentioned “transcendental pain”; also, it lost Lacan’s “jouissance” when commencing out from the nothingness state.
This way the entire Žižekian approach cleverly set Heidegger an antagonist against all philosophical arguments of “being”. However, everybody knows how the anti-semitist pulled out him from the thousand-year political culture of language. His lifelong searching for original was not a mere philosophical avidity. This man shocked and charged by the political culture of language and philosophy what he thinks a destruction of real wisdom. Heidegger believed: philosophy is “poie¯sis”, where the poet raises question over again so that no answer can stifle his journey to the openness and freedom.
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… The history of original is incomplete; as well as the starting moment of “being” never could be completed. If we assume any particular point as starting that means we consider the creation is complete; if we consider it complete, then it cannot be original; because original could never be completed; only a startingless history of “being” is able to solve the mystery of “being and beginning”. Therefore, Heidegger always welcomes his readers to overcome the historiology and overtake the timeless history as referential of the “being and beginning”.
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Slavoj Žižek’s approach appeared problematic for Heidegger’s reader. He feels discomfort because Heidegger persuades him cutting his own throat when he deals the big question of life with anxious displeasure. Maybe it sounds weird but anxiety and displeasure is the mother of philosophy. Not only Heidegger, as well Hegel, Nietzsche and many other great original thinkers are critical on the logitimacy of “being”. They criticize the logicians who use any particular point of history to understand the beginning and beingness of the “being”. That means they tried to legitimate the beginning problem of “being” by pick some historical event for this. The risk is there, that is, we can consider this logification of history an ultimate solution for the original questions of “being” or the beginning of “being”. How all this begins and how “being” has maintained its beginnings through the continual process of appearance and disappearance of things in the world? —suchlike question lead us to stumble on the history; it provoked us grounded the historical point a fact to solve the unknowable state of original beginnings of the “being”.
Heidegger treated this scientific rationale a “historiology of being”; it means grounded any particular point of history as proof to solve the original problem of “being” or the beginning of “being”. This grounding is unable to cross the logic-border where we can feel the beginning of “being” an unknowable continuity of incomplete history. The history of original is incomplete; as well as the starting moment of “being” never could be completed. If we assume any particular point as starting that means we consider the creation is complete; if we consider it complete, then it cannot be original; because original could never be completed; only a startingless history of “being” is able to solve the mystery of “being and beginning”. Therefore, Heidegger always welcomes his readers to overcome the historiology and overtake the timeless history as referential of the “being and beginning”. He said in his notebooks:
“In Being and Time and everywhere in my thinking, history means the prehistoriological and the superhistoriological… My “historiological” lecture courses and “interpretations” are all historical meditations, not historiological considerations of the past… Therefore, historical meditation— which arises only in creative thinking—must always accomplish an anticipation for what has been, i.e., must show more therein and show something more originary. Accordingly, such meditation is always histologically false but historically true… Historical truth of historical meditation does not mean that the past is correctly presented as it is in itself, but that the future comes to light in what has been, even if and precisely if what has been is suppressed and not mastered in its forestalling yet unliberated power, i.e., when the past becomes a task for us, but never the object of a calculation.” [See: Black Notebooks by Martin Heidegger]
The meaning of above-mentioned paragraph is weighty; it helps to recognize the real Heidegger who might stay far away to the person Žižek tried to depict in his article. Historiological narrations are indexed materials for logicians. This narration is committed to the accuracy of logical evidence, where it tried to be decisive and “exact” to its logical framing; suppose science always represents exactness when it deals the historical facts about thing’s active presence and absence in the reality. This methodical approach makes scientific searching historiological. Heidegger thinks it applies restrictions to its own process and as well as the language. He considers history a path of searching the truth through historical events. To him, history is the assimilation of events, and the question is the only way to trace it; what he means meditation in his texts.
Heidegger applied the term “historical” when he welcomes his readers to feel the identical happeningness of “being and beings” in the same spacetime continuity. His philosophy replaces “historiological” and this way he replaces his position as a philosopher. He marked him the seeker of openness where historical events are happening since from the timeless originary. His moral about history is clear and that is: —historical events mean comprehension of events through meditation; this meditation never imposes any decision, nor it does overtake other decision to establish it as the only logical truth of history. Slavoj Žižek interprets Heidegger, but he missed the entire path where Heidegger separates himself from Hegel and all other great thinkers. The history of “being” always attached it to the historiology of “being”; Heidegger might be the exception who again came along with (after Nietzsche) pre-Socratic flavor to read the history as events, rather justify it through only the logical enframing.
… Maybe it sounds weird but anxiety and displeasure is the mother of philosophy. Not only Heidegger, as well Hegel, Nietzsche and many other great original thinkers are critical on the logitimacy of “being”. They criticize the logicians who use any particular point of history to understand the beginning and beingness of the “being”. That means they tried to legitimate the beginning problem of “being” by pick some historical event for this. The risk is there, that is, we can consider this logification of history an ultimate solution for the original questions of “being” or the beginning of “being”.
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Historical searching not bound to describe the past event “as it is” or battling to fix it by “as it is”, rather it tried to find and explain the essence of an event in light of meditation, mean thinking. Heidegger treats his discourse as a combinedness of historical facts, but he was not submissive to mean historical facts as historiological. Maybe due to the reason many times he uses the obsolete word “beyng” to mean the latter implication of that the word “being”. As well as he uses “Da-sein” and differentiates it from the historical “Dasein”. The history of “beyng” is happening in the endless “Da-sein” state and this state is “there”, means it always remains and will be.
However, history of “beings” happened in the “Dasein” state, that means it has extinction and germination. That’s why it forgets the history of “Da-sein” and permits itself to rule by the “Dasein”, means the history of beings. The history of “Dasein” tried to justify the history of “beyng” which actually narrates historiological beginnings of beings, which is abortive to reach the history of “beyng”. This is the battleground between Heidegger and other thinkers; Žižek failed to address it with care when he criticized Heidegger in excuse of his reproach to Hegel.
This absent-mindedness often happened in Žižek’s case where he quickly forgets the starting point of his discourse. Suppose his article (Hegel versus Heidegger) started from Hegel but gradually he posited a mere part on this. Not new for Žižek, rather it is the same old timbering with slight extensions. According to his article, Heidegger accused Hegel because he forgets to mention the “phenomenal negative experience” in case of “yet not appeared being”. Slavoj Žižek considers it a boomerang for Heidegger himself. He said:
“Heidegger’s reproach to Hegel and claim that it is Heidegger who is not able to think this “transcendental pain”—and that he misses the path to think it precisely by dropping all too early the term “subject” needed to think the (inhuman) core of being-human.” [See: Hegel versus Heidegger by Slavoj Žižek]
The question is inevitable there, —why Hegel avoid this? Heidegger explained the reason in his book “Being and Time” with careful humbleness. Hegel forgets to mention the “phenomenal negative experience” because such phenomena (Hegel mentioned it “self-relating negativity of being”) was difficult to explain. When “being” stayed in the “nothingness” state and interacts itself by staying there, —this transcendental position happened in that state beyond over the cognitive science of humans. Hegel was make-bound to mystify this state in his “Science of logic”.
We have to remember this: Nothingness is the reason of Everythingness; contrary, Everythingness can be explainable through Dialectical Materialism; so saying anything about Nothingness might not possible because it happened in the inevitable abstruse reality of “being”. Karl Marx pulled out Hegel from this ambiguity by grounded his “being” on the historical “beings”; anyway, to Hegel, it was the essential dialectical relation between Nothingness and Everythingness; from where determinant (mean Nothing) always determined the Marx-mentioned “being”; in this case it means Everythingness. Therefore, we can avoid the complexity but cannot ignore it if we want to deal the original reason of being and beingness. So that we can say the negative phenomenal is the reason for all positive “groundedness” that later appeared when “being” happened.
Hegel was puzzled to solve this but Heidegger solves it by using his subjective beingness in Da-sein state. We know Heidegger’s stance for “being” is not the one-shot game. It an endless subjectivity of “beings”, an amalgamation of “being” played agent’s role there, in where every “yet not appeared being” experienced the shuddered anxiety for its beingness. This realization once led Heidegger to replace “nothingness” by his “thereness”. Beingness of “being” is possible when each individual “being” stringed by the plurality before to appear as “beings” in the apparent Dasein world. Heidegger called it “partitioning”:
“The world —as empowerment of the “there”; this the tethered time, without a flight into empty eternity. Yet to acquire this tethering, in order to bring things to a stand, time in its partitioning must first become pressing.” [See: Black Notebooks, Martin Heidegger]
… Žižek hired Lacan for saying it “jouissance” or the anxious ecstasy of life. Any argument of “why being happened”, it cannot be negotiable if “beings” failed to realize the delightful ecstasy in spite of anxiety that “I think therefore I am.” Žižek thinks Heidegger’s inability of considers “cogito” a necessary element for grounding the real “being”, it makes his arguments unrealistic and whimsical for any further philosophical investigation of “being”.
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This partitioning indicates the “anxiety of being”. According to Heidegger, the genesis of “being” not means “production” (Entstehung); rather it means “position”; “as to emerge and to rise up [Aufstehen]”. This positioning could happen from the myriad events of the time; that’s why if anybody wants to search the originary of “being” he cannot connect him with it through the apparent reality; he must make a journey to the remote and lone antiquity when it happened beyond over his familiarity with the language.
The peaceful exit of “being” is essential for Heidegger because of today’s meaning of “being” compelled it to act as a pleasure-partner of modernity. Another shocking fact maybe this, modernity obliged “being” dwells with the language, that a total discomfort for it. Because this language is unfit to mean the innate beingness of “being” in a Da-sein state. Thus, it not a question of how “being” come to the appearance, or from wherein it stays before its appearance, rather a question of what the “being” is and how language confined it by meaning and does it valid or not.
This consideration might lead Heidegger hired Hölderlin to think like this, —“being” is crying for back to its “origin”; it is crying to negates all meaning that prevents it back to the pre-Socrates age when philosophy dealt original question with openness and freedom. How comes appearance played a pivotal role in that age, and an answer to this question was treated real adventurism so that it leaded querist to the next.
When Heidegger encoded Holderlin a “transition” for the “other beginning”, the meaning appeared profound to him. It led him to such remoteness where none of the human beings sees them as a prisoner of language; whither no modernity obliged them to think they are tortured and pained by the language; where the meaning of “being” is not a technological word game which enforced them to talk with language under preconditions. We will highlight this in next chapter.
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